A novel risk-based decision-making paradigm by Pedro Morgado et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 17 February 2014
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00045
A novel risk-based decision-making paradigm
Pedro Morgado1,2, Fernanda Marques1,2, Miguel B. Silva1,2, Nuno Sousa1,2 and João J. Cerqueira1,2*
1 School of Health Sciences, Life and Health Sciences Research Institute (ICVS), University of Minho, Braga, Portugal
2 ICVS-3Bs PT Government Associate Laboratory, Braga/Guimarães, Portugal
Edited by:
Valérie Doyère, Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique, France
Reviewed by:
Françoise Dellu-Hagedorn, Centre
National de la Recherche
Scientifique UMR 5287, France
Stan Floresco, University of British
Columbia, Canada
*Correspondence:
João J. Cerqueira, Life and Health
Sciences Research Institute,
University of Minho, Campus de
Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
e-mail: jcerqueira@
ecsaude.uminho.pt
This paper presents a novel rodent decision-making task that explores uncertainty,
independently of expectation and predictability. Using a 5-hole operating box, adult male
Wistar rats were given choices between a small certain (safe) food reward and a large
uncertain (risk) food reward. We found that animals strongly preferred the safe option
when it had a fixed position or was cued with a light in a random placement scheme,
but had no preference for safe or risk options when the latter were associated with
light. Importantly, when the reward was manipulated animals could perceive alterations
in the outcome value and biased their choice pattern to the most profitable option. In
addition, we found that the D2/D3 agonist quinpirole biased all decisions toward risk in this
paradigm. Finally, a c-fos analysis revealed that several brain areas known to be involved
in decision-making mechanisms, including the medial prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal
cortex, the nucleus accumbens and the striatum, were activated by the task. In summary,
this paradigm is a useful and highly reliable tool to explore decision-making processes in
contexts of uncertainty.
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INTRODUCTION
Making decisions is a common task in our lives that entails eval-
uation of risks and rewards associated with different options
available.When deciding between two goods presented in a differ-
ent manner, individuals choose based on effort to obtain reward,
amount of outcome and chance of win. A growing body of evi-
dence has demonstrated individual differences on choice pattern
(Penolazzi et al., 2013) and that proneness to choose high or
low risk options are affected by several neuropsychiatric disorders
such as schizophrenia (Heerey et al., 2008), obsessive compulsive
disorders (Starcke et al., 2010), depression (Smoski et al., 2008),
attention deficit and hyperactive disorder (Ernst et al., 2003;
Drechsler et al., 2008), addictive disorders (Bechara, 2003) and
pathological gambling (Ochoa et al., 2013). Similar observations
were obtained using animal paradigms of decision-making that
resemble features of those described for humans (for instance,
Floresco and Whelan, 2009). However, a strong bias of both ani-
mal and human decision-making studies evaluating risk relates to
the fact that distinction between high and low uncertainty choices
usually also encompasses a decision between advantageous and
disadvantageous options, making behavioral analysis more dif-
ficult and dubious. Indeed, while any choice possibly, but not
certainly, leading to a punishment/loss of reward should be classi-
fied as risky, most of these paradigms equate risk with long-term
losses (which should not be always the case).
In this regard, one of the most popular paradigms is the
rodent equivalent of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), developed
for humans by Bechara et al. (1994) and adapted for rodents
independently by van den Bos et al. (2006b), Pais-Vieira et al.
(2007); Rivalan et al. (2009), and Zeeb et al. (2009). In the IGT,
the subject has to choose between four options (cards in humans;
levers, maze arms or nose poke apertures in rodents), two of
which yield higher rewards but also, randomly presented, higher
losses than the other two. As a result, choice of the former (dis-
advantageous options) results in an overall net loss that contrasts
with an overall net gain when choosing the latter (advantageous
options). Choices in this paradigm depend of the factoring of
value, uncertainty and, particularly, time-discount, with near
sighted subjects more sensitive to immediate gains than to long-
term losses, in what constitutes an interesting model of complex
economic decisions. Besides the IGT, other paradigms of risk
decision-making for rodents include: (1) risk-discounting tasks
(Cardinal and Howes, 2005; Floresco et al., 2008), where sub-
jects have to choose between small certain rewards and large
probabilistically delivered rewards presented in a crescent and/or
decrescent manner; (2) delay-discounting tasks, characterized
by choice between smaller rewards available immediately ver-
sus larger rewards available after a varying delay, and frequently
used for the study of impulsive choice both in humans (Johnson
and Bickel, 2002; Dixon et al., 2003) and in rodents (Ito and
Asaki, 1982; Green and Estle, 2003; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008);
(3) risk punishment decision tasks where rats choose between
a small safe reward and a large reward associated with pun-
ishment (Simon et al., 2007, 2009); (4) effort-discounting tasks
(van den Bos et al., 2006a; Floresco et al., 2008; Cocker et al.,
2012), evaluating cost/benefit decision-making, where animals
choose between a small reward obtainable after a low amount
of physical effort and a larger reward after considerably more
work.
In fact, available animal models of decision-making, including
those specifically designed to assess risk and uncertainty did not
isolate uncertainty from value (Jentsch et al., 2010; Winstanley
et al., 2011) or do so only in some trials within a single session,
in a discounting format (St Onge and Floresco, 2009), preclud-
ing a deeper analysis of the neuronal circuits involved and the
effects of pharmacological manipulations. As few animal models
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explore the processing of uncertainty, independently of expecta-
tion and predictability, there were three main goals in this study:
(i) establishing a new risk-based decision-making paradigm in
which rats choose between certain (certain/safe) and uncertain
(uncertain/risky options) options, with similar overall expecta-
tions and predictability and where animals pattern of choice can
be described as neutral in non-manipulated conditions; (ii) map-
ping the brain regions activated by the task; and (iii) analyze how
risk-based decision-making is affected by outcome value manip-
ulations (through increasing or decreasing reward amount) and
by a dopaminergic drug that has been previously shown to affect
probability based decision-making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ANIMALS
Sixty adult male Wistar rats (Charles River Laboratories,
Barcelona, Spain), aged 2 months and weighting 250–300 g at the
start of the experiment, were housed in groups of two under stan-
dard laboratory conditions with an artificial light–dark cycle of
12:12 h (lights on from 8:00 A.M. to 8.00 P.M.) in a temperature-
and humidity-controlled room. Animals were given 2 weeks to
acclimate to the housing conditions with ad libitum access to food
and water. A food deprivation regimen was initiated 24 h before
the initiation of behavioral training and testing to maintain the
subjects at approximately 90% of their free-feeding body weight.
Rats had free access to water while in the home cage.
All experiments were conducted in accordance with local reg-
ulations (European Union Directive 86/609/EEC) and National
Institutes of Health guidelines on animal care and experimen-
tation and approved by Direção Geral Veterinária (DGV; the
Portuguese National Institute of Veterinary).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RISK-BASED DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM
Behavioral training and testing took place in square 5-hole oper-
ant chambers (OCs, 25 × 25 cm; TSE Systems, Germany). Each
chamber has five squared apertures (2.5 cm) mounted into a
curved wall and elevated 2 cm from the grid floor, each hole
equipped with a light (3W lamp bulb) and crossed by an infra-red
detector that monitored animal nose pokes. In the opposite side,
one pellet dispenser is used to deliver rewards into a hole crossed
by an infra-red detector to check pellet dispenser entries. Three 5-
hole OCs, placed within sound attenuating boxes with individual
electrical fans for ventilation and white noise production, were
simultaneously used in our studies.
The decision-making paradigm is presented in Figure 1. Each
daily session was initiated by switching the home light on, 5 s
after the animal was placed in the chamber, and lasted for 30min
or 100 trials, whichever occurred first. In each trial, rats could
choose between a “safe” hole (resulting in the delivery of 1 pel-
let with 100% probability) and 4 “risk” holes (resulting in the
delivery of 4 pellets with 25% probability). In our opinion, this
1 against 4 hole arrangement results in a more naturalistic option
that a 1:1 arrangement with the same probabilities. Indeed, in
our model the choice is just between playing safe (by nose pok-
ing in the non-illuminated hole) or risking (by nose poking in
one of the 4 illuminated holes, only one of which will result in
reward delivery), the probabilities arising from the number of
illuminated holes. Moreover, the use of more holes augments
the complexity of the task as well as the possibilities to modu-
late the gains/losses. Importantly, this design of risky and safe
choices evens the overall outcome of either option, allowing an
analysis of risk-taking behaviors independently of reward value
or delay. After each choice, animals had to check the amount
of reward received at the pellet dispenser (they were taught to
do it by applying a 10 s “lights off, holes inactive” penalty if
they failed to do so), home cage light was switched off and a
new trial started 5 s later. Number of trials completed, total time
spent, animals’ choices and omissions as well as pellets received
in each trial were automatically registered by the software and
analyzed.
In the process of optimizing the conditions of our risk-based
decision-making assessment, we tested three different strategies
for cueing risk and safe options using three different sets of ani-
mals. Of note, each set of animals was trained for 20 days and
choice preferences recorded and analyzed. Our first attempt was
to attribute the safe option to one (fixed) hole, with the five
different positions being evenly distributed among different ani-
mals to even out any placement bias (fixed placement condition.).
As this resulted in a strong bias toward the safe option (see the
results section), that hampered the observation of minor shifts in
FIGURE 1 | Risk-taking task. Flow-chart of one trial in the neutral condition, in which the overall gain is the same for risky or safe choices; each daily session
consisted of 100 trials or 30min of testing.
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behavior, we used a different group of animals to test a second
condition in which the safe option was signalized with a light and
randomly attributed, in each trial, to one of the 5 holes (random
placement—light safe condition). Curiously, this also resulted in
a strong preference for the safe choices (see the results section),
which made us test a third, and final condition, in which the safe
option was signalized with the absence of light (the risk option
all had a light on) and randomly attributed, in each trial, to
one of the 5 holes (random placement—light risk condition).
Importantly, this was the condition used in all our experiments
thereon, namely those described in the remainder of the present
paper.
In all subsequent experiments, animals were trained in this
final protocol (“random placement—light risk”) and tested in 3
consecutive 8-day decision-making paradigms: in the first, safe
and risk choices were rewarded with 1 and 4 pellets, respectively,
as described above (Figure 1), resulting in no net gain (neutral
condition); in the second, only the risk choice reward was dou-
bled (8 instead of 4), resulting in an average long-term profit for
those who risk (risk favorable condition); in the third, only the
reward in safe choices was doubled (2 instead of 1), resulting in a
long-term profit for those who tend to choose safe (safe favorable
condition).
c-FOS IMMUNOHISTOCHEMISTRY
A separate set of 10 animals were trained in the “random
placement—light risk” paradigm until acquisition of the task
(10 days) and then tested in the neutral condition for an addi-
tional 10 days. In the last day of testing, animals were sacrificed
90min after the end of the behavioral task with a lethal injec-
tion with pentobarbital and then transcardially perfused with
phosphate buffered saline (PBS) followed by 4% paraformalde-
hyde (PFA). Control animals were exposed to the same condi-
tions, but in the last day of testing were rewarded in the OC
independently of nose poking, in an overall amount similar to
that of the tested animals. Brains were removed and post-fixed
in PFA for 4 h and then transferred to an 8% sucrose solu-
tion and kept at 4◦C. 50µm coronal sections of the forebrain
were serially cut on a vibratome at 50µm and collected in PBS
(0.1M; pH7.2). For c-fos immunohistochemistry, sections were
firstly incubated in H2O2 (3.3% in PBS) solution for 30min
and then sequentially washed in PBS and PBS-T (0.3% triton
X-100; Sigma-Aldrich). Sections were then incubated in 2.5%
(in PBS-T) fetal bovine serum for 2 h followed by anti-fos pri-
mary antibody [1:2000 in the same solution; PC38 Anti-c-Fos
(Ab-5), Calbiochem] overnight. After several washes in PBS-T,
sections were incubated with secondary antibody (1:200 in PBS-
T; polyclonal swine anti-rabbit E0353, DAKO) for 1 h, again
washed in PBS-T and incubated in avidin-biotin complex (ABC,
1:200, Vector Laboratories) for 1 h. Sections were then sequen-
tially washed with PBS-T, PBS and Tris-HCl (0.05M, pH 7.6) and
incubated in 0.0125% diaminobezidine tetrahydrochloride (DAB;
Sigma Immunochemicals, St. Louis, USA) and 0.02% H2O2 in
Tris-HCl for 3–5min to reveal the labeling. Finally, sections were
placed on SuperFrost Plus slides (Braunschweig, Germany), dehy-
drated and counterstained with hematoxylin. All procedures were
performed at room temperature.
The number of c-fos positive cells was counted within the
boundaries of the medial prefrontal cortex [prelimbic cortex
(PrL), infralimbic cortex (IL) and cingulate cortex (Cg1)],
orbitofrontal cortex [medial (MO), ventral (VO) and lateral (LO)
parts], somatosensory cortex (SSC), motor cortex (MC), insula,
dorsal striatum [dorsolateral striatum (DLS) and dorsomedial
striatum (DMS)], and nucleus accumbens [shell (NAcS) and core
(NAcC)] as defined by the Paxinos andWatson (1998). c-fos posi-
tive cells densities (number of positive cells/cross sectional area of
the region of interest) were calculated for comparisons between
groups. Cross sectional area of each region was calculated accord-
ing to the Cavalieri principle (Gundersen et al., 1988). For this,
we randomly superimposed onto each area a test point grid in
which the interpoint distance, at tissue level, was: 100µm for
IL and MO; 150µm for PL, VO and LO; 350µm for MC, SSC,
NAcS and NAcC; and 500µm for DLS and DMS, and counted
the points that fell into the boundaries of the region of inter-
est. These procedures were done using using StereoInvestigator
software (MBL Neuroscience, VT) and a camera attached to a
motorized microscope.
TREATMENT WITH THE D2/D3 AGONIST
A separate set of 20 animals was trained in the “random
placement—light risk” paradigm for 10 days and then tested in
the neutral, risk favorable and safe favorable conditions (8 days in
each). In the last 3 days of each test, half of the animals received
injections of the dopamine D2/D3 agonist quinpirole while others
received vehicle. Quinpirole hydrochloride (0.15mg/kg; Sigma-
Aldrich), dissolved in 0.9% sterile saline to a volume of 1ml/Kg,
was administered intraperitoneally. Injections were given 15min
before behavioral testing and dose was selected in accordance with
previous reports showing behavioral effects of the drug (Kurylo
and Tanguay, 2004; Boulougouris et al., 2009).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data was analyzed using SPSS (version 19.0; IBM). Results are
expressed as group means ± SE. Differences between groups were
analyzed using independent-samples Student’s t-test (for c-fos
activation) and repeated measures ANOVA (for behavioral data).
Differences were considered to be significant if p < 0.05.
RESULTS
As expected, during training animals increased the number of
completed trials in each session, inversely decreasing total time
spent to do so; by the 8th day of training all animals were able to
complete the maximum number of trials (100) (Figure 2A).
As already mentioned, the first set of experiments was devoted
to searching the appropriate cueing for this risk-based decision-
making task. When the safe option was fixed in the same hole
during the entire protocol, animals rapidly acquired (from the 5th
day) and maintained a strong (>80%) preference for this option
(Figure 2B). Similarly, when the safe option was randomly placed
but associated with a light, animals had a clear (>60%) preference
for safe choices, that was evident from the 9th day of training
(Figure 2C). On the contrary, when the safe option was randomly
placed but associatedwith absence of light, animals did not display
any preference between safe and risk options, a pattern of choices
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 45 | 3
Morgado et al. A novel risk-based decision-making paradigm
FIGURE 2 | Behavioral characterization of the task and effects of
environmental cue modeling on risk-based decision. (A) Total time
and number of trials by session. Animals significantly decreased the total
session time and increased the number of trials per session until the
maximum of 100 in the first 2 weeks. (B) Pattern of choices using a
fixed placement of the safe nose-poke hole. Animals increase their
preference for safe choices to more than 80%. (C) Pattern of choices
when the only illuminated nose-poke hole was the safe/certain
option—light signaled safe. Animals consistently increased their
preference for this option to more than 60%. (D) Pattern of choices
when the nose-poke holes corresponding to risk/uncertain options were
illuminated. Animals stabilize their performance at around 20% of safe
choices (choice levels), without a net preference for risk or safe. This
was the design adopted in the final version of the task.
that was established relatively early and maintained during the
entire protocol (Figure 2D). The latter design was selected for the
final version of the task and used in the subsequent analysis.
Having set the task design, we explored the brain areas
activated by its performance by analyzing c-fos expression, an
immediate early gene whose expression is triggered by neuronal
activation. In comparison with animals rewarded independently
of nose poking (controls), in an overall amount similar to that
of the tested animals, performance of the task in the neutral con-
dition induced the activation of several brain areas, including the
medial prefrontal cortex subregions (PrL: t = −3.61, P < 0.05; IL:
t = −1.58, P < 0.05; Cg1: t = −2.22, P < 0.05), orbitofrontal cor-
tex subregions (Medial OFC: t = −3.14, P < 0.05; Ventral OFC:
t = −3.97, P < 0.05; Lateral OFC: t = −7.28, P < 0.05), insular
cortex (t = −4.45, P < 0.05), dorsal striatum (DLS: t = −5.45,
P < 0.05; DMS: t = −2.86, P < 0.05), and nucleus accumbens
(NAcc Shell: t = −2.41, P < 0.05; NAcc Core: t = −3.76, P <
0.05). No differences were found in the activation of the prin-
cipal somatosensory (t = −0.88, P = 0.40) and motor cortices
(t = −1.78, P = 0.09) (Table 1).
We then set to assess whether preference for safe choices
could be manipulated, and first tested the impact of changes
in reward magnitude. When rewards for either the risk or
the safe options were increased (risk favorable or safe favor-
able conditions, respectively), animals switched their pattern of
choices accordingly, decreasing (−15.3% ± 6.68), or increas-
ing (+16.0% ±8.70) the percentage of safe choices relative to
the baseline (condition: F = 73.928, p < 0.001) (Figure 3A). No
differences were found among omissions (condition: F = 0.055,
p = 0.947) (Figure 3B) and total time spent (condition: F =
0.069, p = 0.933) (Figure 3C) in the three different paradigms.
As expected, the number of total pellets received while in the risk
favorable condition was higher than in the other two conditions
(condition: F = 66.867, p < 0.001) (Figure 3D).
In our last experiment, we assessed the impact of quinpirole,
a D2/D3 agonist known to influence decision-making strate-
gies, in the performance of our task. Quinpirole-treated animals
displayed lower rates of safe choices (neutral −17.7%, risk favor-
able −18.4%, safe favorable −22.3%) in all testing conditions
when contrasted to controls (Figure 4; treatment F = 23.101, p <
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0.001; condition F = 22.765, p < 0.001; interaction F = 1.217,
p = 0.308). Despite these diminished rate of safe choices, they
keep changing their pattern of choices among the three dif-
ferent conditions (neutral, risk favorable and safe favorable).
Table 1 | c-fos positive cells by region.
Brain Operant chamber Risk-based Statistics
region controls (n = 10) decision-making
task (n = 10)
LOFC 2.27 ± 0.39 6.23 ± 0.38 t = −7.28*
VOFC 3.66 ± 0.60 8.60 ± 1.09 t = −3.97*
MOFC 2.81 ± 0.59 6.00 ± 0.82 t = −3.14*
Ins 0.79 ± 0.21 2.02 ± 0.18 t = −4.45*
PrL 2.88 ± 0.54 5.29 ± 0.40 t = −3.61*
IL 1.53 ± 0.25 5.39 ± 0.20 t = −1.58*
Cg1 2.63 ± 0.60 5.80 ± 0.96 t = −2.22*
NaccC 2.04 ± 0.52 4.90 ± 0.56 t = −3.76*
NaccS 2.69 ± 0.65 4.64 ± 0.47 t = −2.41*
DLS 1.02 ± 0.23 4.08 ± 0.51 t = −5.45*
DMS 1.76 ± 0.36 4.25 ± 0.80 t = −2.86*
SSC 2.09 ± 0.28 2.54 ± 0.42 t = −0.88
MC 2.07 ± 0.08 2.71 ± 0.34 t = −1.78
Values in cells/µm2 (x1000) ± s.e.m.; L/V/MOFC, lateral/ventral/medial OFC;
PrL, Prelimbic cortex; IL, infralimbic cortex; Cg1, cingulate cortex; NaccC/S,
Nacc Core/Shell; DLS/DMS, Dorsomedial/lateral striatum; SSC, somatosenso-
rial cortex; MC, motor cortex. Controls were placed in the operant chamber
and rewarded the same amount of sucrose pellets, but independently of
nose-poking.*p < 0.05 vs. similar reward no-contingency controls.
No differences were found among the number of total pellets
received, omissions and total time spent between treated and
non-treated animals (data not shown).
DISCUSSION
Given the growing interest in neuroeconomics, several experi-
mental paradigms of gambling and/or risky decision-making in
rats have been put forward in the past years, with the aim of study-
ing such behaviors in animal model and facilitating the dissection
of the neural substrate of economic decisions and its modulators.
Through recent years, several animal paradigms were devel-
oped to measuring decision-making when the choice is based
on a context of conflict related to one or more of the follow-
ing components: the probability, the effort, the delay and the risk
of punishment. Importantly, none was designed to isolate uncer-
tainty from value, effort or time-discounting. Even the paradigms
specifically developed to the assessment of risky decision-making
such as the Rodent Version of the balloon Analog Risk Task
(Jentsch et al., 2010) were not suited to evaluate uncertainty,
emphasizing on the amount of risk that subjects are willing to
accept to obtain a reward. In order to specifically address this
determinant of decision-making we developed a novel risk-based
task. In it, animals have to choose, by making a nose poke,
between a non-illuminated hole that always triggers the delivery
of a reward (certain/safe option) and four illuminated holes, only
one of which will trigger the delivery of a 4 times bigger reward
(uncertain/risky options), in what amounts to a 25% probability.
Importantly, due to this design, both choices yield, on the long
run, the same amount of reward, thus isolating uncertainty from
both value and time-discounting. Additionally, as probability of
FIGURE 3 | Effects of outcome value manipulation on risk-based
decision. (A) Behavioral responses to outcome value manipulations.
Increases (doubling) in the amount of reward of the risky choices (risk
favorable condition) or the safe choices (safe favorable condition) lead to a
reduction (risk favorable) or increase (safe favorable) in the % of safe choices,
compared with the neutral condition, which is of similar magnitude. (B)
Average number of omissions per each daily session. No differences were
found between conditions. (C) Total time spent by each daily session did not
change among different paradigms. (D) Total pellets received by daily session.
Significant differences were found on risk favorable paradigm. ∗p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 4 | Acute behavioral effects of D2/D3 agonist Quinpirole.
Quinpirole treated animals increased the percentage of risk choices in all
different probabilities protocols. ∗p < 0.05.
win in the uncertain/risk option is kept constant, uncertainty is
isolated from amount of risk. This, in our opinion, represents a
major advantage of our task.
Another modulator of animals’ behavior addressed in the pre-
liminary tests leading to the final design was the presence of light.
In this regard, we found that, associating a light with the hole cor-
responding with the safe choice resulted in a clear preference for
safe options, whereas signaling the risky options with light (and
the safe hole with the absence of light) resulted in a balanced
behavior in which animals chose each option approximately at
chance levels (20%). Since they choose each option at chance lev-
els, it could be argued that animal choices were random. However,
this is not likely to happen since animals changed their behavior to
the most profitable option when paradigm was adapted to favor
risk or safe. Interestingly, the fact that, in basal conditions, ani-
mals have a similar preference for the safe and each of the risk
options is also a distinctive aspect of our task in respect to pre-
vious ones in as much as it facilitates the study of risky-behavior
modulators, including manipulations of reward or timing, drug
treatments or environmental factors.
In order to test this possibility in of our paradigm, we decided
to manipulate the value of each option, and found that ani-
mals were able to recognize such changes and shift their pref-
erence accordingly, as revealed by an increased preference to
risky options when risk profit was doubled and to safe options
when amount of reward was increased. Importantly, we also
found that acute administration of D2/D3 agonist quinpirole
biases behavior to risk, which was in accordance with previ-
ously reported effects of dopaminergic agents on decision-making
behaviors, associating dopaminergic agonists with increased rates
of risk choices (Riba et al., 2008; St Onge and Floresco, 2009;
St Onge et al., 2010). These observation could raise three dif-
ferent explanations, all possibly triggered by an augmented
dopaminergic tone: first, this bias can be related with an over-
estimation of probabilities associated with risk options; second,
it might involves an increase in random choices or the estab-
lishment of habitual perseverative behaviors; third, it can be
related with an increased preference for light-associated choices.
Interestingly, these animals were still able to adapt their choices
upon changes in outcome value. Indeed, despite of displaying
higher rates of safe choices than controls even when it was less
profitable, quinpirole treated animals were able to update their
representation of the relative value of each option. These mecha-
nisms seem to be mediated by a fronto-striato-thalamic-frontal
circuit that involves mPFC, OFC and dorsal striatum, areas
found to be activated by the task. Interestingly, contradictory
data emerged from previous reports on the mPFC contribu-
tion to risk-based decision-making: while St Onge et al. (2011)
described a disruption of risk-based decisions induced by quinpi-
role and an increasing of risky behavior induced by D2 specific
antagonist eticlopride, both specifically injected on the mPFC,
other studies report that mPFC inactivation (D2 receptors are
inhibitory) as well as disruption of communication with baso-
lateral amygdala is associated with decreased risk aversion (St
Onge and Floresco, 2009; St Onge et al., 2012). Additionally,
the OFC was found necessary to the increased expression of
incentive motivation to obtain larger rewards (Jentsch et al.,
2010), which allows us to speculate that this brain region was
necessary to the expression of quinpirole-induced risk-prone
behaviors. In line with our results, striatal D2/D3 receptors
were also found to mediate risk-based decisions with D2/D3
antagonists promoting a decreased rate of uncertain choices in
rats with lower striatal levels of these receptors (Cocker et al.,
2012).
Finally, we characterized the brain activation patterns
recruited by our task and found increased activity (as assessed
by increased c-fos expression) in almost all key areas known to
be involved in decision-making processes, including the OFC and
mPFC, the insular cortex, the dorsal striatum and the nucleus
accumbens. Interestingly, these areas were also shown to be
engaged in performance of the IGT including the ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al., 1999; Fellows and Farah, 2005),
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Manes et al., 2002; Bolla et al.,
2004; Fellows and Farah, 2005), the orbitofrontal cortex (Manes
et al., 2002; Bolla et al., 2004; Hsu et al., 2005), the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) (Tucker et al., 2004) and the striatum (Hsu
et al., 2005). Such similarities are not surprising since, despite
differences in task design, both require the processing of uncer-
tainty, the representation of value and the prediction of reward,
three of the main components of decision-making which have
been mapped, respectively, to the loop between the NAcc and the
OFC (Doya, 2008), the OFC and ACC (Tremblay and Schultz,
1999; Gehring andWilloughby, 2002; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006) and the dorsal striatum (Schultz, 2002). However, these
results should be carefully analyzed since we used as controls ani-
mals passively receiving food on the operate behavior chamber. In
this regard, use of a better control, such as animals on a task with
5 “safe” holes, could improve the robustness of our findings.
Altogether, these features suggest that this novel behavioral
paradigm is valuable in exploring animal preferences in a con-
text of uncertainty/risk, independently of value, effort, amount
of risk, expectation and predictability. The ability to isolate dif-
ferent components of the decision-making process is of relevance
to better understand the conditions in which these processes are
impaired and, eventually, to better define intervention strategies
that might remediate impairments on decisions.
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